Groundwater Depletion in Jammu and Kashmir in a Changing Climate

Irshad Ahmad Bhat (Research Scholar, Politics and Governance)

Groundwater in Jammu and Kashmir has long existed in a paradoxical space: essential to survival yet absent from political imagination. Unlike rivers that flood and glaciers that retreat visibly, groundwater operates silently, accumulating slowly and declining invisibly. This silence has been mistaken for stability. The widespread belief that a region blessed with snow-fed rivers and alpine hydrology could never face groundwater stress has shaped decades of neglect. Climate change has now punctured this illusion. What is unfolding beneath the soil of Jammu and Kashmir is not a sudden crisis but a cumulative failure produced by climatic disruption layered upon institutional indifference. Groundwater reservoirs are being destabilised not merely by rising temperatures or erratic precipitation, but by a governance framework that never considered subsurface water as a strategic resource worthy of regulation, protection, or long-term planning.

Historically, groundwater systems in Jammu and Kashmir developed under a relatively predictable climatic regime. Snowfall during winter accumulated gradually across catchments, melting slowly through spring and early summer. This slow release allowed water to percolate through soils, recharge alluvial aquifers, and sustain springs and base flows even during dry months. Wetlands, floodplains, and marshes played a crucial mediating role, absorbing excess water during high-flow periods and releasing it steadily into the subsurface. Climate change has disrupted this entire sequence. Winters have become shorter and warmer, snowfall increasingly erratic, and precipitation events more intense and short-lived. The hydrological logic that sustained groundwater recharge for centuries has been fractured within a few decades.
The Kashmir Valley’s aquifers, largely alluvial and relatively shallow, are particularly sensitive to this disruption. Districts such as Budgam, Pulwama, and parts of Baramulla historically benefited from high recharge rates due to porous soils and wetland connectivity. Today, these same characteristics make them vulnerable to rapid depletion. Intense rainfall events associated with climate change generate surface runoff rather than infiltration. Snowmelt now occurs earlier in the season, often before soils are sufficiently thawed or vegetated to absorb water efficiently. The result is a paradoxical situation where water availability appears abundant at the surface during short periods, while groundwater levels continue to decline. Rivers still flow, but their relationship with aquifers has weakened, breaking a critical hydrological linkage that once stabilised the system.
In Jammu, the situation is structurally different yet equally precarious. Much of the region is characterised by hard-rock geology, where groundwater occurs in fractures and weathered zones rather than expansive aquifers. Recharge here is inherently slow, dependent on
prolonged rainfall and soil infiltration. Climate change has shortened recharge windows while simultaneously increasing demand. Rising temperatures have intensified evapotranspiration, reducing effective rainfall. Erratic monsoons have made surface water unreliable. In response, groundwater extraction has increased, often without any understanding of aquifer limits. What is extracted in a single dry season may take years to replenish, if it replenishes at all. Climate change thus transforms a naturally constrained groundwater system into an overdrawn reserve on the brink of exhaustion.
Ladakh presents the most fragile and unforgiving case. Groundwater here is inseparable from cryospheric processes. Glacial melt and seasonal snow are not supplementary sources; they are the foundation of subsurface recharge. As glaciers retreat and snowlines shift upward, groundwater recharge declines sharply. While short-term increases in meltwater may temporarily boost flows, this is a transitional phase, not a solution. Once glaciers retreat beyond critical thresholds, base flows diminish, springs dry, and groundwater becomes effectively non-renewable. In such a context, climate change does not gradually stress groundwater; it accelerates a collapse with little margin for recovery.
Yet climatic forces alone do not explain the depth of the crisis. The more damning factor is how society and the state have responded to hydrological uncertainty. Groundwater has been treated as an emergency substitute rather than a finite reserve. When surface systems falter, borewells proliferate. This pattern is visible across urban and peri-urban Kashmir, where drilling has expanded rapidly with minimal regulation. There is no comprehensive licensing regime, no enforceable extraction limits, and no serious attempt to align withdrawal with recharge capacity. Climate change has increased variability, but unregulated extraction has converted variability into depletion.

Urbanisation has magnified this imbalance. Srinagar’s expansion over recent decades has systematically undermined groundwater recharge. Wetlands that once acted as infiltration zones have been encroached upon or drained. Open soils have been replaced with concrete, sealing the ground against absorption. Rainfall that should have replenished aquifers is now diverted into drains, carrying sediment and waste into rivers. Climate change exacerbates this dysfunction by increasing rainfall intensity and urban water demand simultaneously. The city’s response has been narrowly technocratic: drill deeper wells, install larger pumps, and expand supply networks without addressing the ecological foundations of water availability. This approach treats groundwater as an infinite buffer rather than a finite system under stress.
Agriculture, traditionally reliant on surface irrigation and seasonal rainfall, has increasingly turned to groundwater as climatic uncertainty grows. Orchardists and paddy farmers draw on tube wells during dry spells, often with little understanding of long-term consequences. This shift is frequently described as farmer resilience, but resilience without recharge is simply deferred vulnerability. As wetlands shrink and soils dry, groundwater extraction becomes a one-way transaction. Climate change accelerates this imbalance by increasing crop water demand while reducing effective precipitation. The cumulative impact is a steady drawdown of aquifers that once sustained agriculture through climatic variability.
The drying of springs offers the clearest evidence of systemic groundwater stress. Across rural Kashmir and parts of Jammu, springs that served as reliable sources of drinking water for generations have become seasonal or disappeared entirely. Springs respond directly to groundwater pressure; their decline signals widespread depletion rather than isolated anomalies. Each dried spring pushes communities toward deeper borewells, further intensifying extraction. Climate change does not initiate this process alone, but it accelerates it by disrupting recharge and increasing demand. The loss of springs is not merely a hydrological concern; it represents the erosion of social systems built around shared water sources.
What makes the groundwater crisis particularly dangerous is its invisibility. Unlike floods or droughts, groundwater depletion unfolds slowly, without dramatic markers. Wells deepen incrementally. Pumps run longer. Scarcity becomes normalised. Climate change thrives in such conditions, where slow degradation escapes political attention. By the time groundwater collapse becomes visible in the form of widespread well failure or contamination, recovery may be geologically impossible or economically prohibitive.
This invisibility has allowed governance failure to persist unchecked. Groundwater monitoring in Jammu and Kashmir remains fragmented and inadequate. Aquifer mapping is incomplete, and data rarely informs policy decisions. Climate adaptation strategies continue to focus on surface water, disaster response, and infrastructure expansion, leaving subsurface systems largely unaddressed. This is not a gap in knowledge but a failure of political prioritisation. Groundwater does not fit easily into narratives of development or spectacle, and so it is sidelined.

Climate change exposes the consequences of this neglect with increasing severity. Rising temperatures, erratic precipitation, and glacial retreat do not merely add stress; they strip away the buffers that once compensated for mismanagement. Groundwater, long taken for granted, is now absorbing the cumulative impact of climatic disruption and institutional apathy. The result is a system approaching critical thresholds without meaningful intervention.
The crisis unfolding beneath Jammu and Kashmir’s soil is therefore not simply environmental. It is structural and political. Groundwater reservoirs are being depleted not because climate change is unavoidable, but because governance has refused to engage with slow, invisible processes. Climate change has accelerated decline, but the groundwork was laid by decades of indifference. To continue treating groundwater as an emergency reserve rather than a strategic resource is to accept a future of chronic scarcity and social vulnerability. The ground still holds water, but its capacity to do so is being eroded faster than institutions are willing to admit.
Climate change does not act upon a neutral society. It interacts with inequality, governance failure, and institutional bias, turning groundwater scarcity into a deeply uneven and quietly violent process. In Jammu and Kashmir, groundwater depletion is not experienced uniformly.
It is absorbed differently by households, farmers, urban elites, and marginal communities. The subsurface becomes a site where climate stress is translated into social hierarchy.
Those with financial and technical capacity respond to falling water tables by drilling deeper borewells, installing high-capacity pumps, and securing uninterrupted electricity supply. In urban Srinagar and expanding peri-urban settlements, this response has become routine. Groundwater extraction is individualised and privatised, turning a shared ecological reserve into a competitive resource. Climate change amplifies this competition. As recharge declines and variability increases, deeper extraction becomes the dominant survival strategy. Those without means are left to cope with drying wells, unreliable public supply, and the erosion of traditional water-sharing systems. Groundwater scarcity thus hardens existing inequalities, embedding climate injustice underground.
Rural areas experience this inequity differently but no less severely. In villages dependent on springs and shallow wells, depletion translates into longer collection times, declining water quality, and increased labour burdens, disproportionately borne by women. When springs dry, households are forced to depend on tanker supply or distant sources, eroding social cohesion built around shared water points. Climate change accelerates this breakdown by making spring flows erratic and seasonal. What disappears is not only water, but a social infrastructure that once mediated scarcity collectively.
Agricultural communities face a similar stratification. Larger landholders with capital access invest in deeper tube wells and pumping equipment, allowing them to maintain productivity despite climatic uncertainty. Small farmers, by contrast, struggle with declining yields and rising costs. As groundwater levels fall, pumping becomes energy-intensive, linking water access to electricity reliability and affordability. Climate change thus locks farmers into a cycle of rising input costs and diminishing returns. What is framed as adaptation becomes a mechanism of exclusion.
Groundwater quality degradation adds another dimension of crisis. As water tables decline, the concentration of contaminants increases. Nitrates from fertiliser use, seepage from poorly managed sanitation systems, and leaching from waste dumps contaminate shallow aquifers. Climate change exacerbates this process by reducing dilution during dry periods and mobilising pollutants during intense rainfall events. In parts of rural Kashmir, households report changes in taste, colour, and smell of well water- early indicators of chemical contamination. Once polluted, aquifers are notoriously difficult to remediate. Contamination transforms groundwater from a refuge into a risk, undermining its role as a climate buffer.
Urban contamination is equally troubling. Srinagar’s ageing sewage infrastructure leaks into the subsurface, while unregulated construction disrupts natural filtration layers. As extraction increases and recharge declines, pollutants become more concentrated. Climate change intensifies this dynamic by increasing water demand and reducing flushing flows. The result is a slow erosion of potable groundwater reserves, pushing cities toward expensive treatment or distant supply schemes. This trajectory reflects a governance preference for technological fixes over ecological protection.
The institutional response to these converging crises has been largely performative. Groundwater is mentioned in policy documents, but rarely operationalised. Monitoring remains sporadic, data fragmented, and enforcement weak. Aquifer mapping exercises, where they exist, are seldom integrated into land-use planning or climate adaptation strategies. Borewell drilling continues with minimal oversight, often legitimised after the fact. Climate change adaptation remains surface-centric, focused on flood control, river embankments, and supply augmentation. The subsurface remains politically invisible.
This invisibility is not accidental. Groundwater challenges dominant development narratives. It cannot be easily showcased, inaugurated, or branded. Protecting recharge zones requires restricting construction, regulating extraction, and confronting vested interests. Climate change makes these choices unavoidable, yet governance continues to postpone them. The result is a policy vacuum where groundwater depletion proceeds unchecked, masked by short-term supply interventions.
Wetland degradation illustrates this failure starkly. Wetlands across Jammu and Kashmir once functioned as natural recharge systems, absorbing floodwaters and sustaining aquifers. Their encroachment and pollution represent not only ecological loss but hydrological sabotage. Climate change increases the importance of such buffers, yet they remain politically expendable. Restoration efforts are fragmented, underfunded, and often symbolic. Without wetlands, groundwater recharge becomes increasingly dependent on unpredictable precipitation, further destabilised by climate variability.
Urban planning compounds this problem. Surface sealing through roads, housing colonies, and commercial complexes reduces infiltration dramatically. Climate change increases rainfall intensity, but sealed surfaces convert rain into runoff rather than recharge. Cities thus become hydrologically hostile spaces, exporting water rapidly while extracting it aggressively. This contradiction lies at the heart of urban groundwater decline in Jammu and Kashmir.
Energy-water interactions deepen vulnerability. As groundwater levels fall, pumping requires more energy. In a region already struggling with power reliability, this links water access to infrastructure deficits. Climate change intensifies demand during heatwaves and dry spells, stretching both water and energy systems simultaneously. This interdependence amplifies risk, turning groundwater depletion into a multi-sectoral crisis.
The dominant response-seeking new supply through distant sources or deeper drilling-reveals a refusal to confront limits. Such approaches treat groundwater as an infinite buffer, ignoring geological realities. Climate change exposes the fragility of this assumption. Aquifers recharge slowly, if at all, under altered climatic regimes. Extraction without protection becomes a form of delayed collapse.
Yet groundwater systems are not beyond recovery. Aquifers respond to reduced extraction, restored recharge, and protected landscapes. Wetland revival, rainwater infiltration, regulated drilling, and aquifer-based planning are not radical ideas. They are hydrological necessities.
Climate change demands such measures not as optional reforms but as survival strategies. The failure lies not in feasibility but in political will.
Ultimately, groundwater in Jammu and Kashmir represents a moral and institutional test. It asks whether governance can address slow, invisible crises before they become irreversible. Climate change has accelerated the timeline, stripping away the illusion of abundance. The subsurface is no longer a silent reserve; it is a warning system. Ignoring it ensures that scarcity will arrive not as an external shock but as a self-inflicted condition.
The tragedy is that this outcome is neither inevitable nor natural. It is produced through neglect, short-termism, and refusal to engage with complexity. Groundwater collapse will not announce itself dramatically. It will manifest as cumulative loss: drying springs, contaminated wells, declining yields, and deepening inequality. Climate change will be blamed, but responsibility will lie closer to home.
To treat groundwater seriously is to rethink development, urbanisation, and adaptation itself. It requires shifting from extraction to stewardship, from visibility to substance, from emergency response to long-term resilience. Jammu and Kashmir still has groundwater beneath its soil, but it no longer has the luxury of denial. Climate change has turned neglect into risk, and risk into consequence. The question is not whether groundwater will define the region’s climate future, but whether that future will be shaped by foresight or by exhaustion.